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An oft-noted feature of artificial intelligence research is its interdisciplinary nature. 
AI draws on, and contributes to, research in such diverse fields as philosophy, logic, 
psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, mechanical engineering, control theory-and of 
course many other areas of computer science. A discipline of great relevance to AI 
which has. perhaps received less attention until recently is economics. 
A primary goal of AI is the creation of decision-making artifacts, or agents, that 
act, with varying degrees of autonomy, on behalf of their designers, owners, or users. 
In service of this goal, the predominant approach in AI has been to endow the agents 
with interests of their own (coinciding with those of the party on whose behalf they 
act) as well as reasoning mechanisms based on principles of rationality of one kind or 
another. Naturally, then, when AI researchers have considered multi-agent systems, the 
agents halve generally been similarly endowed with interests, rational decision-making 
capabilities, and-importantly-the ability to model the interests and capabilities of 
other agents. 
Stated this way, it is at first puzzling why the connection between AI and cco- 
nomics has not been stronger heretofore. After all, the decision-making behaviors of 
self-interested agents as they interact with their environment (including, especially, 
other self-interested agents), the resulting emergent phenomena, nd mechanisms that 
can influence these behaviors, are the province of economic theory. Why then has eco- 
nomics not had a more tangible impact on AI? We see two fundamental reasons, one 
substantive and one cultural. 
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The slight economic influence on AI to date may be due in part to the different 
objectives of the fields. Economics is primarily concerned with explaining the decisions 
and interactions of rational self-interested agents (or communities thereof), or design- 
ing policies that influence these interactions to further certain global objectives. AI, in 
contrast, is largely (though not exclusively) concerned with constructing self-interested 
agents, the very entities economic theory takes for granted. Although modeling compu- 
tational entities as rational beings is standard AI practice, we do not generally have the 
luxury of assuming rationality-it is our burden to explain how to realize approximately 
rational behaviors in operational computational terms. 
The different intellectual heritage of the two fields may also account for the dearth 
of connections between AI and economics. At its inception, AI was influenced by 
several intellectual movements. One was philosophical epistemology, reflected in the very 
influential logicist approach pioneered by McCarthy. Another was psychology, reflected 
in the work of Newell and Simon, and, to an extent, Minsky. Neither of these movements 
is strongly reflected in modern economic theory. In particular, modern microeconomics, 
decision theory, and game theory are typically couched in a strict Bayesian setting, 
which until recently was foreign to both the logicist and psychologicist elements of 
AI4 
While the distance between AI and economics is considerable, it is shrinking, as re- 
searchers in both fields are finding light on the other side of the “rationality abstraction 
barrier”. Within economics, there is an increased interest in practical, psychologically- 
oriented, or computational theories of decision making. Recent studies have taken ac- 
count of computational limits of various sorts, expressly model learning processes, or 
measure computational or communication complexity of economic institutions and de- 
cisions. 
Within AI, we see several reasons for interest in economic theories. First, economic 
(especially decision-theoretic) principles offer realistic and flexible models for the de- 
sign of self-interested agents. These principles have been adopted in AI and given a 
computational flavor. Additionally, the Internet has emerged as a productive environ- 
ment for deployment of computational agents, and its inherently distributed nature has 
naturally directed attention toward multi-agent systems. New media for agent interaction 
open research questions in the design of mechanisms and protocols, and methods for 
predicting or influencing the behavior of agents within these mechanisms. Participat- 
ing agents have substantial incentive to model and reason about the others, and both 
economic and computational concepts bear directly on this task. 
The overlap in problems and techniques has not in our view yet been matched by 
a proportional amount of expressly interdisciplinary effort. Nevertheless, these consid- 
erations clearly suggest that mainstream economic principles can play a crucial role in 
the study of multi-agent systems, and, indeed, in recent years they have increasingly 
4 We remark in passing that this observation also resolves an apparent paradox: the connection between 
AI and economics has been weak despite the fact that one of the founders of AI-Herbert Simon-won a 
Nobel Prize in economics. However, Simon’s brand of economics was strongly psychological in flavor, and 
by-and-large has not been reflected in mainstream economics work (but see later comments about recent 
trends in economics). 
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done so. $’ Thus it should not be surprising that in response to our call for papers on 
“Principles of Multi-Agent Systems”, the principles that emerged have been primar- 
ily economic. For this reason, we have named the resulting journal issue “Economic 
Principles of Multi-Agent Systems”. 
When considering the broad distinguishing characteristics of AI research vis-Pvis 
economics, it is worthwhile to ask where AI has diverged from economics, where AI 
methods can exploit economic principles and theories, and what AI has to offer to the 
further development of such theories. 
The complexity of solving decision problems forced AI researchers to adopt sim- 
plifying assumptions in the earliest days of the field. A clear example is the almost 
exclusive focus-until recently-of planning research on sequential decision problems 
with fixed goals, deterministic actions, and complete knowledge. The economic view of 
self-interested agents as utility maximizers, while not rejected outright, was not adopted 
in its full generality, as classical planning concentrated on combinatorial issues. Work 
in decision-theoretic planning over the last several years has over the last several years 
has consildered more general decision makers and has embraced at least part of the eco- 
nomic perspective on agents. This move has been forced by the need to design agents 
that deal with uncertainty, competing objectives, and so on. Techniques from decision 
theory, operations research, and control theory have all been adopted in this enterprise. 
The combinatorial nature of decision problems has consistently plagued AI methods, 
more so than economic models, again due to the difference in outlook. In formulating 
a model to explain some economic activity or phenomenon, an economist can carefully 
craft the problem specification, ignoring irrelevant features, abstracting away details, 
approximating details and solutions where appropriate. This process itself requires a 
considerable degree of intelligence. The AI researcher has no such luxury. An intelli- 
gent agent must be equipped to deal with a large number of problem features thrown 
its way. ‘The resulting combinatorial explosion threatens to make reasoning and de- 
ciding impossible without a designer or user nearby to help, say, rule out irrelevant 
details. AI research has focused on two general, complementary approaches to this 
problem. 
The first is the use of intensional, feature-based problem representations that al- 
low large decision-making scenarios to be specified concisely. Work in knowledge 
representation-using both logical and probabilistic formalisms-has emphasized pre- 
cision in problem specification and solution characterization, tradeoffs in expressive 
power and tractability, and the use of structural properties laid bare by good repre- 
sentation schemes to ease the computational burden of reasoning and decision making. 
Poole’s paper in the collection, ‘The Independent Choice Logic for modelling multiple 
agents under uncertainty”, addresses certain representational issues along these lines. 
Specifically, he presents a logic-programming-style language and methodology for the 
specification of self-interested agents and their interactions with each other and their 
environment. 
5 Evidence of this trend is tbe granting of the 1995 Computers and Thought Award to two individuals for 
research significantly influenced by strands of economic thought. Because of this connection, we have invited 
the recipients-Stuart Russell and Sarit Kraus-to reprise their respective award lectures in this collection. 
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The second approach explicitly accounts for time and other costs of deliberation 
or computation in determining appropriate courses of action. If the calculation of an 
“optimal” action is not worth the computational effort, the rational behavior is not 
optimal in the idealized sense. Thus one must often decide what (and how long) one 
will think about before thinking about it. This notion is strongly tied to the decision- 
theoretic concept of value of information, and more generally the economic concept of 
opportunity cost. It is just one of the ways that rationality notions differ for bounded 
and idealized agents. In “Rationality and intelligence”, Russell argues that the bounded 
case is the relevant one for AI, and offers a conceptual framework for analyzing the 
rationality of bounded agents. 
This last point suggests an interesting feature of the applicability of economic theo- 
ries to computational systems. Most economic models assume idealized, rational decision 
makers interacting in narrow, precisely prescribed ways. These assumptions, while crit- 
ical to the tractable exposition and implementation of any theory, often fail the test of 
descriptive adequacy. However, what may be unrealistic with respect to rich environ- 
ments populated by imperfectly understood interacting human agents, may often provide 
adequate descriptions of restricted environments populated by formally specified inter- 
acting computational agents. Moreover, to the extent that AI develops well-characterized 
models of rational or approximately rational computational agents, we can provide ideal 
domains for investigating and applying economic theories. 
We have described a strand of AI research that deals with designing self-interested 
agents, which merely gets us to the “base-level” assumptions of most economic models. 
Economics is a social science, and as such, the primary role of this individual level is as a 
foundation for analyzing agent interactions, emergent properties of these interactions, and 
mechanisms that influence the interactions and their results. As noted above, considerable 
recent work in AI has addressed interactions within systems of computational agents. 
One reason (but by no means the only application) is the emergence of networked 
communications and interactions, especially the Internet, as an importance facet of 
everyday life. The opportunity to have computational agents do real work on behalf of 
human clients and users delivers a pressing need for the development of software agents 
and interaction mechanisms to facilitate complex decision making in such settings. The 
existence of collections of approximately rational computational gents, sorely lacking 
in the past, is in part available to the AI researcher as computational agents of increasing 
sophistication emerge (a trend that is sure to accelerate in the near future). 
As anticipated in early work of Doyle, and reinforced subsequently with work by 
Rosenschein and his colleagues, the framework of game theory has exerted significant 
influence on formal models of multi-agent systems. 6 One of the more active contributors 
of game-theoretic models to the AI literature is Kraus, whose “Negotiation and coopera- 
tion in multi-agent environments” surveys much of this work. In this article, Kraus also 
considers other “multi-entity methodologies”, and discusses their relevance to the design 
of systems of interacting agents. Sandholm and Lesser, in “Coalitions of computationally 
60ne could argue that game theory’s influence on AI dates from the first minimax search chess algo- 
rithm developed by Shannon circa 40 years ago. However, prevalent adoption of the general game-theoretic 
formulation of multi-agent action is considerably more recent. 
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bounded agents”, apply game-theoretic concepts to the particular issue of coalition for- 
mation. S,pecifically, the authors characterize the propensity of bounded computational 
agents to act as cooperative subgroups in a well-defined class of interaction problems. 
Their analysis illustrates the value of combining economic (game-theoretic) and com- 
putational (complexity) analyses in situations where computational properties affect the 
value structure of the problem. 
Distributed coordination among multiple agents is of central importance to both game 
theory and AI. In “On the emergence of social conventions: modelling, analysis, and 
simulations”, Shoham and Tennenholtz introduce a stochastic model in which local be- 
havior rules lead to coordination over time. While similar in flavor to several models 
within game theory, and even couched in a game theoretic setting, this paper is distin- 
guished by its computational orientation. In particular, most of the results in the paper 
concern the rate with which conventions evolve, and most of these results were obtain 
through computer simulations. 
Koller and F’feffer’s paper, “Representations and solutions for game-theoretic prob- 
lems”, similarly places a computational spin on familiar game theoretic notions. Game 
theoretic -formulations are attractive in part because of their generality, but this generality 
comes at a price. The search for joint agent strategies satisfying a solution criterion (e.g., 
Nash equilibrium) can grow combinatorially with the individual strategy spaces, which 
in turn may be exponential in size of the domain. Keller and Ffeffer propose a logic- 
programming-style language with which to naturally and compactly specify games by 
exploiting the structure of the game. They also describe an implemented system, Gala, 
which efficiently interprets these specifications and computes solutions of the game. 
This type of work suggests one sort of product that AI has to offer to economics. 
Work on specification of agent interactions-perhaps, as in Gala, expressed in terms of 
programming constructs-can be expected to expose further regularities in multi-agent 
situations, and thus provide further opportunities to exploit game structure. 
Other potential contributions of AI to economics draw on AI’s models of the agents 
themse1ve.s. To the extent that research in the design of self-interested agents informs 
(and is informed by) descriptive theories of such agents, the results of economic and 
AI research mutually benefit the other. Specifically, notions such as computation cost 
and bounded rationality, as well as the use of specific forms of representation and their 
influence on reasoning, should impact economic models as they become more realistic 
and accurate, just as they have the design of self-interested agents in AI. 
In many economic models (e.g., of bargaining), not only is the specific structure of 
agents largely unanalyzed, so are the means by which agents interact or communicate. 
Once again, the emphasis in AI on building agents that interact requires that concrete 
theories and models of this interaction be developed. Such normative or practical models 
can clearly have an impact on the descriptive models required in economics. 
That agents act on behalf of their designers or users is a critical assumption under- 
lying much research in AI. It requires techniques for interacting with people (or other 
agents) in order to determine models of the environment and preferences of the user. 
Knowledge acquisition, especially the automation of the process, is a key element of 
the AI enterprise that does not have an exact counterpart in economic theories, where 
agents are assumed to know the context in which decisions must be made. Models 
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of preference licitation and revealed preference do play a role in decision analysis 
and economics, but are especially crucial in AI. In AI the focus of some research is 
on interactions with users that is straightforward and efficient. Reasoning directly with 
qualitative information about beiiefs and preferences i  an area where AI seems poised 
to cont~bute to economic unde~t~ding. Brafman and Tennenholtz’s article, “Modeling 
agents as qualitative decision makers”, formalizes a form of belief ascription within this 
category. 
We see that, while the aims of economics and AI are somewhat different, the models 
and solution techniques hould have much in common. It is surprising that the two 
fields have not had tighter connections throughout the years, but it is encouraging to see 
the fields moving closer together. The papers in this volume are representative of this 
effort. Each embraces ome aspect of some economic theory in its approach to an AI 
problem. Each also offers some insight into the model being adopted, illus~ating the 
potential for AI research to have an influence on economics. We sincerely hope that 
this volume, or more precisely, the research of which this collection is a small sample, 
presages ubstantial interaction between research and researchers in economics and AI. 
